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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of corporate governance quality and board gender diversity on
the corporate dividend policy for a set of all non-financial companies listed on Amman Stock
Exchange (ASE) during the period 2009-2015. The results documented that corporate
governance quality and board gender diversity proxies have positive impact on corporate
dividend policy. The results also showed that the women representation on the boards of nonfinancial companies in Jordan is considered low relative to other countries. Particularly, the
causes of the poor board gender diversity in Jordan range from lack of awareness about the
benefits of gender diversity to the lack of legislation that regulates this issue. It is recommended
to non-financial companies in Jordan to boost their compliance with the corporate governance
code and adopt diversity policies to enhance the effectiveness of the boards and keep favorable
relationships with their shareholders. Furthermore, regulatory bodies in Jordan should take a step
towards encouraging gender diversity on boards.
JEL Classification: G34
Keywords:Corporate Governance Quality, Board Gender Diversity, Women on Boards, Female
Directors, Corporate Dividend Policy
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Introduction
The ultimate economic goal for corporations is to make profit where such profit can be held
in the corporation and used in its activities or it can be distributed to shareholders in form of
dividends which requires a trade-off between the payable amount value and the value to
retain (Almeida et al, 2015). Kaźmierska-Jóźwiak (2015) suggested that dividend policy is
considered a controversial issue in corporate finance, and the investment, financing and
dividend decisions are considered the major pillars of decision making in corporate finance.
Whereas, Jensen (1986) suggested that the conflict of interest between shareholders and
managers could have an impact on the corporate dividend policy since managers prefer to
retain earnings instead of distributing the earnings to the shareholders in form of dividends.
In contrast, shareholders prefer higher level of cash distributions especially when the firm has
few internal positive net present value (NPV) investment opportunities.
The issue of women on boards gained much attention over the last ten years and now at least
12 countries are regularly reviewing the gender balance of their top boards. Particularly,
different actions have been taken by countries in order to increase the women representation
at boards and top management level where some countries force a quota or consider
legislation for quotas while other countries adopt alternative action through “comply or
explain” approach or the “if not, why not” approach, (Davies, 2011) . Board gender diversity
is considered a key factor contributing to the quality of corporate governance where several
corporate governance codes in developed countries emphasized the importance of gender
diversity to avoid the problems arising from like-minded individuals and thus enhance the
effectiveness of the boards. For instance; the UK corporate governance code (2016) stated
that “The problems arising from “groupthink” have been exposed in particular as a result of
the financial crisis. One of the ways in which constructive debate can be encouraged is
through having sufficient diversity on the board. This includes, but is not limited to, gender
and race”; Japan’s corporate governance code (2015) stated in “Principle 2.4 Ensuring
Diversity, Including Active Participation of Women: Companies should recognize that the
existence of diverse perspectives and values reflecting a variety of experiences, skills and
characteristics is a strength that supports their sustainable growth. As such, companies should
promote diversity of personnel, including the active participation of women.”
German corporate governance code (2014) stated that “When appointing the Management
Board, the Supervisory Board shall also respect diversity and in particular, aim for an
appropriate consideration of women”; In Australian, Corporate Governance Principles and
Recommendations (2014) stated in Recommendation 1.5 “A listed entity should: (a) have a
diversity policy which includes requirements for the board or a relevant committee of the
board to set measurable objectives for achieving gender diversity and to assess annually both
the objectives and the entity’s progress in achieving them”. However, in less developed
countries (such as Jordan) less attention has been paid to the issue of board gender diversity.
So far, the existing legislations in Jordan and the corporate governance code issued by Jordan
Securities Commission (JSC) have not yet taken any step towards the issue of board gender
diversity. Despite that the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 2014 recommended
developing and emerging markets including Jordan to encourage board diversity by
promoting women’s leadership; providing and sharing arguments on the benefits of board
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diversity; and starting a policy-level dialogue aimed at increasing the number of women on
boards.
The literature in Jordan reveals that there is linkage between corporate governance and
dividend policy. However, less attention has been paid to the area regarding the linkage
between the quality of corporate governance and the corporate dividend policy. As well, to
the best of researcher knowledge, there is no other study examined the impact of board
gender diversity on corporate dividend policy which resulted in a gap in the existing
literature which this paper is motivated to fill. Particularly, the purpose of this paper is to
examine the impact of corporate governance quality and board gender diversity on the
corporate dividend policy. This paper is mainly motivated by the international interest to the
corporate governance as well to the gender diversity on boards as an important factor
contributing to the quality of corporate governance.

1. Theoretical Background
1.1.Corporate governance, Gender diversity and Dividend policy
Corporate governance is defined as “"the system by which companies are directed and
controlled" (Cadbury, 1992). As well, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) defined corporate governance as “Procedures and processes according
to which an organisation is directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure
specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different participants in the
organisation – such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders – and lays
down the rules and procedures for decision-making”. Particularly, as a result of the global
financial crisis; the response of the regulatory authorities was directed to corporate
governance (Rakin, et al., 2012). The agency problem arises from the separation of
ownership from control, and corporate governance practices initially appeared to minimize
the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders (Baydoun, et al., 2012; AlRahahleh, 2016). Agency relationship is defined as a contract between one party (the
principal) and another party (the agent) to perform some services on their behalf. In other
words, it is a delegation of decision-making authority given by principal to the agent.
Particularly, the agency problem arises since the decisions taken by the agent affect both his
own wealth and the wealth of shareholders (Jensen & Meckling 1976; McColgan, 2001).
Board gender diversity provides corporations with positive outcomes since diversity
generates greater variety of perspectives and this increase the likelihood of creative and
innovations in the board which reflects positively the effectiveness of the board and its
decisions (Byoun et al., 2015). According to several authors (Croson & Gneezy, 2009;
Faccio et al., 2012; Huang &Kisgen, 2013; Van pelt 2013; Van Uytbergen & Schoubben,
2015), there is a difference between men and women where women are more risk averse than
men as well women will adopt less aggressive strategy choice and will invest in more
sustainable projects than men. (Joecks et al., 2013; Van pelt, 2013) suggested that when
proportion of women on board is small, this will reflect negatively the firm performance. In
contrast, when this proportion increases, this will reflect positively the firm performance
since presence of women become an advantage to the firm. In particular, the U shaped
relation suggested that the firm performance will go down to a certain point after this point
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the performance will go up where this point is considered when more than 40% of the board
is women.(Van Uytbergen & Schoubben, 2015) indicated that gender diversity affects
corporation decision making in particular the presence of women either in board of directors
or in management positions affects the corporate governance and the corporate policy.
Likewise, (Byoun et al., 2016) suggested that board diversity either gender or racial is
considered an important factor contributing to good corporate governance.
Dividend policy can be defined as the policy a firm uses to decide how much it will pay to
shareholders in dividends (Ranti, 2013). Dividends are considered an information signal of
firm performance to financial markets where regular dividends is an indicator the firm is
doing well (Al-Amarneh &Yaseen, 2014). Similarly, (Naser et al, 2013; Abu Manneh, 2014)
suggested that dividend policy is considered important signal of company’s prospect of
stability and growth, and eliminating dividends is a signal of poor firm performance.
Particularly, the dividend principle assumes that the firms have to return the generated cash
to the shareholders as dividends when there are no investments opportunities (Almeida et al.,
2015). However, the free cash flow hypothesis implies that managers tend to invest the free
cash flow in negative net present value (NPV) projects instead of paying it out to the
shareholders in form of dividends where the free cash flow is defined as “cash flow left after
the firm has invested in all available positive NPV projects.” (Jensen, 1988; Lang
&Walkling, 1991). Furthermore, (Sindhu, 2014) indicated that the free cash flow hypothesis
considered dividends as a way to prevent managers from investing the free cash flow in sizeincreasing but non profitable projects.
The bird-in-hand theory asserts that in the world of uncertainty and information asymmetry
investors prefer dividend to retained earnings (Al-Malkawi, 2007). Likewise, (Van
Uytbergen & Schoubben, 2015) suggested that investors in particular risk averse investors
prefer dividends to capital gains since dividends are certain and capital gains are not.
Whereas, (Naser et al., 2013) indicated that shareholders and potential investors formulate
investment impressions about the company by looking into management’s ability to generate
dividends.
Dividend payout plays a key role in resolving the conflict of interest between managers and
shareholders since dividends can reduce the free cash flow problem (Byoun et al., 2016).
Corporate governance quality mitigates agency problems and board gender diversity
contributes to the efficiency of corporate governance. Thus, it is expected the corporate
governance and board gender diversity could have an impact on the corporate dividend
policy.

2. Previous Research
Previous research asserts that dividend policy is one of most debated topics in corporate
finance. Debate about what drive firms to pay out dividends is still valid question (Ranti,
2013). Several empirical studies documented that corporate governance practices and
presence of women on boards is considered determinants of corporate dividend policy. In this
regards, Mitton (2004) studied the impact of corporate governance on dividend policy across
365 firms from 19 countries, the results showed a positive relationship between corporate
governance and dividend payouts. Al‐Malkawi (2007) studied the determinants of corporate
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dividend policy across set of all companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange during the
period (1998 to 2000).The results revealed that the dividend payout is affected by insider
ownership and state ownership which supports agency cost theories. Furthermore, the
outcomes showed that firm size, age and profitability are considered determinants factors of
corporate dividend policy. Kowalewski et al. (2008) studied the determinants of dividend
policy and whether corporate governance is considered as a determinant of companies’
dividend policy across 110 non-financial companies listed on Warsaw Stock Exchange in
Poland during the period (1998-2004). The study used Transparency and Disclosure Index
(TDI) to measure corporate governance quality where the results revealed that an increase in
TDI increased the dividend payout ratio.
Sawicki (2009) examined the association between corporate governance and dividend policy
across five East Asian countries during the period 1994–2003. The results showed a negative
association between corporate governance and dividend policy across prior crisis period.
However, the results revealed that dividend policy is affected positively by corporate
governance across post crisis period. Van Pelt (2013) studied the impact of board
characteristics on dividend policy for a sample of all S&P 500 firms during the period 2008 2011. In particular, the final number of companies included in the analysis was 436 firms
with 1350 firm year observations. The results showed a positive association between board
size and dividend policy. However, the results showed that the percentage of inside directors,
the percentage of women, insiders’ ownership and Directors’ tenure are statistically
insignificant related to dividend policy. Setiawan et al., (2013) tested the impact of corporate
governance on dividend policy for a sample of 248 manufacturing firms listed on Indonesian
Stock Exchange during the period 2004-2006. The study used Transparency and Disclosure
Index (TDI) to measure corporate governance in Indonesia. The results revealed that the
dividend policy is affected negatively by corporate governance which supports substation
theory. Al-Amarneh&Yaseen (2014) examined the association between corporate
governance and dividend policy among 47 industrial companies in Jordan listed on Amman
Stock Exchange during the period 2005-2011. Corporate governance was measured based on
four factors namely; corporate holdings, financial institution holdings, insiders holding and
foreign holding while dividend policy was measured based on dividend yield. The outcomes
showed a positive association between insider holding and dividend yield. In contrast, the
results showed a negative association among foreign holdings and dividend yield.
Van Uytbergen & Schoubben (2015) studied whether gender diversity in corporations
affects companies’ financial policy for a sample of non-financial European companies from
14 countries during the period 2008-2012. The results showed that firms with board gender
diversity affects cash policy not through risk aversion but through increased board
effectiveness. Whereas, after controlling corporate governance quality, the results showed
that board size and insider ownership have a positive impact on cash policy. Byoun et al.
(2016) studied the impact of board of directors diversity and dividend policy for a sample of
2,234 unique firms with 13,325 firm-year observations during the period 1997-2008. The
results pointed out that firms with diverse boards are more likely to pay dividends especially
when the firm generate large free cash flows. Furthermore, the results suggested that diverse
boards play a positive role in enhancing the monitoring and disciplining functions of the
boards for the benefits of shareholders. Pucheta-Martínez&Bel-Oms (2015) studies the effect
of gender diversity on dividend policy across Spanish companies. The outcomes showed that
dividend payout is affected positively the percentage of female directors and by proportion of
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shares held by female directors. However, the dividend policy is affected negatively by
percentage of institutional female directors. Whereas, the percentage of independent and
executive female directors have no effect on dividend payout. Yusof & Ismail (2016) studied
the determinants of dividend policy for a sample of 147 publically listed firms in Malaysia.
The results showed that dividend policy is affected positively by earnings, debt, size and
investment. However, the outcomes showed that dividend policy is affected negatively by
debt and large shareholders.

4. Research Design and Variables Measurement
4.1. Study sample

The study sample consisted of all non-financial (i.e. industrial and service) companies listed
on Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) during the period (2009 – 2015). Consistent with (Fama&
French, 2002; Van pelt, 2013), financial companies were excluded from the study sample due
to their different accounting and reporting rules. The reason behind starting the study period
from 2009 is that corporate governance code for shareholding companies listed on the ASE
was issued by JSC in 2009. In order to include the company in the study sample, required
data to calculate all study variables should be available for the study period. A sample of 110
companies met the required criterion with 770 firm-year observations. To avoid the impact of
extreme values, the values in the 99th percentile and those in the 1st percentile for each of the
study variables were considered as missing values.
4.2. Variables measurement
4.2.1. Dependent variable: Corporate Dividend Policy
Following (Byoun et al., 2016), corporate dividend policy is measured based on three proxies
namely; Div_Dum: is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm pays a cash dividend and
zero otherwise; Div_TA: is dividend-to-asset ratio; Div_E: is dividend per share divided by
earnings per share before extraordinary items. These measures take into account the
propensity to pay dividends and the amount of dividend payouts.
4.2.2. Independent variables: Corporate Governance Quality and Board Gender Diversity
4.2.2.1 Corporate Governance Quality
Corporate governance quality is measured based on governance index that used by (Prommin
et al., 2014) in measuring corporate governance quality. Consistent with (Abbadi et al., 2016;
Al-Rahahleh, 2016), the index is modified in accordance with the rules required by corporate
governance code issued by JSC. The governance index is classified into 4 categories with a
total of 10 standards where one point is awarded for each standard that is satisfied and hence
zero point otherwise. All these standards are required by corporate governance code issued
by JSC under “comply or explain” approach except standard 9 which is voluntarily adopted.
Table 1 provides the governance standards that range from 1 to 10 as well the table also
provides the rule on each standard that is required by corporate governance code for
shareholding companies listed on the ASE.
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4.2.2.2. Board Gender Diversity
Board gender diversity is measured based on four proxies namely; W_B: is proportion of women
on boards; W_EXE: is proportion of executive women on boards; W_OWN: is Percentage of
shares held by women on boards; WM_OWN: is percentage of shares owned by company’s
women major shareholders.

Table 1. corporate governance quality index
Category

Governance standard

Rule in Corporate governance Code

1) Member of board of directors
are not less than five and not more
than thirteen

“The administration of the Company is entrusted to a board
of directors whose members shall be not less than five and
not more than thirteen”

2) One-third of the directors are
independent directors

“at least one third of the board members are independent
members.”

3) Chairman and CEO positions are
separated

“It is not allowed for one person to hold the positions of
chairman of the board of directors and any executive
position in the company at the same time”

4) Disclosure about number of the
board meetings

“The board of directors shall meet at least once every two
months, provided that the number of meetings in the fiscal
year must not be less than six and the number of meetings
shall be disclosed in the company’s annual report”

Board of directors

Board meetings

5) The number of board meetings is
not less than six
6) Existence of Audit Committee

The board of directors shall form the following permanent
committees:
The Audit Committee that shall undertake the task of
overseeing and monitoring accounting and internal control
and auditing activities in the company

Audit

7) Disclosure of frequency of Audit
Committee meetings

The Committee shall meet regularly, not less than four
times a year, and minutes of its meetings must be taken
appropriately

8) Expertise of Audit Committee

. All members of the Audit Committee must have
knowledge and experience in finance and accounting, and at
least one of them must have worked previously in
accounting or finance fields, or that person must have an
academic or professional certificate in accounting, finance
or related fields

9) Engagement of Big 4 auditors
(PWC, KPMG, E&Y or Deloitte)

The company’s external auditor should:
A. Possess a valid license to practice the profession.
B. Be a member of the Jordan Association of Certified
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Public Accountants.
C. Have practiced the profession on a full time basis for at
least three consecutive years, after receiving his license to
practice the auditing profession.
D. Have in his firm at least one partner or employee who
must also meet the above- mentioned requirements.
Nominations and
Compensations

10) Existence of Nominations and
Remunerations Committee

The board of directors shall form the following permanent
committees:

The Nominations and Remunerations Committee, whose
main tasks are:
1. Ensuring the independence of independent members on a
continuous basis.
2. Setting the policy of compensations, privileges,
incentives, and salaries and to review them on a yearly
basis.
3. Defining the company's needs of qualifications at the
upper executive management and employees levels, and the
criteria for their selection.
4. Drawing the company’s human resources and training
policy, monitoring its implementation, and reviewing it on
an annual basis

4.2.3. Control variables
Consistent with prior studies, the study employed three control variables namely; Firm Size
(FS); Financial Leverage (LVG); and Return on Assets (ROA). Firm size measured as the
natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. Kuzucu (2015) argued that large companies tend to
pay higher amount of dividends to decrease agency costs. Whereas, (Dickens et al., 2002;
Maladjian& El Khoury, 2014) argued that large companies pay higher amount of dividends
since these companies tend to be more competitive and attract investors. Financial leverage is
also included as a control variable which measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. It
is expected that firms with high financial leverage are less likely to pay dividends since these
firms need funding and thus are not able to pay dividends to their shareholders. Kuzucu
(2015) indicated that firms that need fund either retain more earnings or issue more debt
consequently firms with less financial leverage are more likely to pay dividends to their
shareholders. Return on Assets (ROA), calculated by dividing net income plus interest
expense on the average total assets, is employed as a proxy of firm profitability. It is
expected that profitable firms are more likely to be able to pay higher amount of dividends.
(Ho, 2003; Aivazian et al., 2003) argued that profitable firms pay higher amount of dividends
to convey their strong financial performance.
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5. Analyses and Discussion
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table (2) depicts the descriptive statistics for the study variables related to 770 firm-year
observations of 110 non-financial companies listed on ASE during the period (2009-2015). The
proportion of women on boards ranges from 0 to 0.50 with an average of 0.043, which implies
that the presence of women on the boards of non-financial companies listed on the ASE is
considered low. Furthermore, the proportion of executive women on boards ranges from 0 to
0.22 with an average of 0.0044, an indication that across the study sample the dominant women
on boards are non-executive board members. As can be noticed from table (2), percentage of
shares held by women on boards ranges from 0 to 0.20 with an average of 0.0031. Moreover,
percentage of shares held by company’s women major shareholders ranges from 0 to 0.59 with
an average of 0.02. Table (2) also showed that the governance quality ranges from 2 to 10 with
an average of (5.678) an indication that part of companies within sample over the study period
violates the rules of corporate governance code. So far, Jordanian companies have not yet
reached the phase of full compliance with corporate governance code issued by JSC.
As reflected in table (2), the dividend to assets ratio ranges from 0 to 0.30 with an
average of 0.025; dividend per share to EPS, which shows how much of a firm’s earnings are
returned to shareholders in the form of dividends, ranges from 0 to 454.09 with an average of
37.14. As well, the table also showed that 42.7% of the sample indicated that the firms’ strategy
was to divide the profit between payments to shareholders and retained earnings and thus try to
satisfy their shareholders’ need (i.e. Dividend payers) while 57.3% of the sample showed that the
firms’ strategy was to retain the profit instead of distrusting it to shareholders in form of
dividends (i.e. non-dividend payers).
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the study variables
Variables

Minimum

Mean

Maximum

Std. Deviation

GOV

2.00

5.678

10

1.78

W_B

.00

.043

.50

.089

W_EXE

.00

.0044

.22

.024

W_OWN

.00

.0031

.20

.015

WM_OWN

.0000

.02

.59

.073

FS

5.67

7.37

9.25

.597

LVG

.00107

.341

1.08

.229

ROA

-45.49

2.42

36.02

9.36

Div_TA

.00

.025

.30

.0434

Div_E

.00

37.14

454.09

52.1

Div_Dum

0

.427

1

.495
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5.2. Correlation matrix
Table (3) provides the correlation coefficients between the study variables. As can be observed
from table (3) there are significant positive correlation coefficients between corporate
governance quality, board gender diversity proxies and corporate dividend policy measures, an
indication that strong corporate governance and diverse boards induce the firms not only to pay
dividends but also to pay higher amount of dividends.
Table (3) also showed that there is significant positive correlation coefficient between
presence of women on boards and ROA which indicates that companies with diverse boards are
more profitable than companies with non-diverse boards. Furthermore, the significant positive
correlation coefficient between presence of women on boards and corporate governance quality
implies that the presence of women on boards is considered a factor contributing to good
corporate governance quality which supports the arguments of (Van Uytbergen&Schoubben,
2015; Byoun et al., 2016). As well, the significant negative correlation coefficient between
percentage of women on boards and financial leverage is an indication that women are more
conservative than men which supports (Croson&Gneezy, 2009; Faccio et al., 2012; Huang
&Kisgen, 2013; Van pelt 2013; Van Uytbergen&Schoubben, 2015) who argued that women are
more risk averse in their financial decisions.
Table 3: Correlation between study variables
Variables

Div_

Div_

Div_

Dum

TA

E

GOV

W_B

WEXE

W_OWN

WM_

FS

LVG

OWN

Div_Dum

1

Div_TA

.629**

1

Div_EPS

.789**

.571**

1

GOV

.132**

.132**

.127**

1

W_B

.074*

.200**

.143**

.106**

1

W_EXE

.167**

.192**

.138**

.116**

.350**

1

W_OWN

.133**

.104**

.093**

.035

.405**

.314**

1

WM_OWN

.124**

.112**

.169**

-.03

.168**

.07

.095**

1

FS

.322**

.255**

.185**

.118**

.012

.02

.023

-.004

1

LVG

-.195**

.246**

.168**

-.091*

.172**

.147**

-.076*

.077*

.261**

1

ROA

.541**

.605**

.364**

.078*

.143**

.155**

.034

.093**

.340**

.209**

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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5.3. Results Discussion
5.3.1 Logistic regression
Table (4) depicts the results of logistic regression which aims to examine the impact of corporate
governance quality and board gender diversity proxies on the likelihood of dividend payout
taking into consideration firm size, financial leverage and return on assets.
As can be observed from the table, the firm’s likelihood to pay dividends is affected
positively by corporate governance quality at 0.01level of significance, which indicates that
strong corporate governance reduces the conflict of interest in the firms and thus induces the
firms to pay dividends to their shareholders. This outcome supports (Mitton, 2004; Kowalewski
et al., 2008; Sawicki, 2009) and contradicts (Setiawan et al., 2013) who provided evidence
showed that dividend policy is affected negatively by corporate governance.
Table 4: Logistic regression results
Variables

GOV

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Div_Dum

Div_Dum

Div_Dum

Div_Dum

Div_Dum

.009**
(.161)
.041*

W_B

(2.242)
0.035*

W_EXE

(10.861)
0.01**

W_OWN

(17.976)
.044*

WM_OWN

(2.866)
FS

LVG

ROA

.000**

.000**

0.000**

.000**

.000**

(1.044)

(1.098)

(1.064)

(1.078)

(1.130)

.001

.000**

0.001**

.000**

.000**

(-1.752)

(-2.058)

(-1.664)

(-1.698)

(-1.945)

.000**

.000**

0.000**

.000**

.000

(.336)

(.340)

(.331)

(.334)

(.326)
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Constant

COX & Snell R

.000

.000

0.000

.000

.000

(-9.612)

(-8.899)

(-8.886)

(-8.989)

(-9.275)

.428

.426

.427

.428

.426

Square

Note:
The table presents the logistic regression results; the dependent variable is dividend dummy (DIV_dum), which
equals one if a firm pays cash dividend and zero otherwise; GOV is corporate governance quality which measured
through governance index as shown in Table 1; W_B: is proportion of women on boards; W_EXE: is proportion of
executive women on boards; W_OWN: is Percentage of shares held by women on boards; WM_OWN: is percentage
of shares owned by company’s women major shareholders; FS is firm size measure as the natural logarithm of
firm’s total assets; LVG is financial leverage measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets; ROA is return on
assets calculated by dividing net income plus interest expense on the average total assets. The numbers in the
parentheses are t -value.
** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table (4) also documented that the firm’s propensity to pay dividends is affected positively by
the percentage of women on boards at 0.05 level of significance, which implies that the presence
of women on boards plays an effective role in increasing firm’s likelihood to pay dividends to
shareholders. This result is consistent with (Byoun et al., 2016; Pucheta-Martínez & Bel-Oms,
2015; Van Uytbergen & Schoubben 2015) who provided evidence showed that the presence of
women on boards plays a role in corporate dividend policy.
The results also revealed that percentage of executive women on boards has a positive significant
impact on the firm’s likelihood to pay dividends to shareholders at 0.05 level of significance,
which indicates that firms with more executive women on boards are more likely to pay
dividends to their shareholders. This result is consistent with (Van Uytbergen&Schoubben,
2015) who argued that firms with female in executive positions have higher cash buffers and
thus are more likely to pay dividends. However, this result is inconsistent with (PuchetaMartínez & Bel-Oms, 2015). As reflected in table (4), the percentage of shares held by women
on boards has a positive effect on the firm’s propensity to pay dividends at 0.01 level of
significance, an indication that women tend to increase the firm’s likelihood to pay dividends
when they own shares which supports agency theorists’ argument in that having a considerable
ownership of the company’s capital is a way to solve agency conflict of interest (Kiel &
Nicholson 2003; Kajananthan & Achchuthan,2013; Al-Rahahleh, 2015). The result is also
consistent with (Al-Malkawi2007;Al-Amarneh &Yaseen 2014;Van Uytbergen & Schoubben,
2015; Pucheta-Martínez & Bel-Oms, 2015) and inconsistent with Van Pelt (2013). Table (4) also
documented that the probability to pay dividends is affected positively by the percentage of
shares owned by company’s women major shareholders at 0.05 level of significance, which
supports the argument that blockholders are probably to be more effective in monitoring
management than dispersed and small shareholders since blockholders have essential investment
and significant voting power to protect these investments (Sheikh et, al.2013; Al-Rahahleh,
2015).The result is also consistent with the outcomes of (Al-Amarneh &Yaseen 2014) and
inconsistent with the outcome of (Yusof & Ismail 2016).
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The results also pointed out that the propensity to pay dividends is affected positively by firm
size and profitability at 0.01 level of significance, which indicate that large companies and
profitable companies are more likely to pay dividends relative to small companies and less
profitable companies. However, the firm’s likelihood to pay dividends is affected negatively by
firm’s financial leverage at 0.01 level of significance, an indication that companies suffer from
high debt are less likely to pay dividends to their shareholders. These results are consistent with
(Dickens et al., 2002; Ho, 2003; Aivazian et al., 2003; Maladjian & El Khoury, 2014; Kuzucu,
2015; Yusof & Ismail 2016)
5.3.2 OLS regression
Table (5) presents the results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis which aims to
examine the impact of corporate governance quality and board gender diversity proxies on the
amount of dividend payouts, using dividend to assets and dividend per share to EPS as proxies of
dividend payout, taking into consideration firm size, financial leverage and return on assets.
Table (5) showed that the dividend payout proxies namely; dividend per share to EPS and
dividend to assets; are affected positively by corporate governance quality and board gender
diversity proxies. Furthermore, the results also showed that firm dividend payout proxies are
affected positively by firm size and firm profitability but negatively by firm financial leverage.
These outcomes support the previous outcomes of logistic regression. Accordingly, it can be
concluded that corporate governance quality and board gender diversity have significant positive
impact not only on the propensity to pay dividends but also on the amount of dividend payouts.
This result is consistent with (Byoun et al., 2016).
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Table 5: OLS Regression results
Variables

Gov

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

Div_E

Div_E

Div_E

Div_E

Div_E

Div_TA

Div_TA

Div_TA

Div_TA

Div_TA

0.018*

0.026*

(2.376)

(2.224)

W_B

0.02*

.001**

(2.331)

(3.427)

W_EXE

0.033*

.003**

(2.140)

(3.031)

W_OWN

.036*

.012*

(2.104)

(2.529)

WM_OWN

Size

LVG

ROA

Constant

Adj-R2

.000**

.007**

(4.717)

2.716

.005**

0.002**

0.002**

.002**

.000**

0.001**

.000**

.000**

.000**

.000**

(2.843)

(3.156)

(3.171)

(3.099)

(3.588)

(3.330)

(3.627)

(3.646)

(3.558)

(3.871)

.001**

0.001**

.000**

.000**

.000**

0.000

.000**

.000**

.000**

.000**

(3.485)

(-3.427)

(-3.529)

(3.612)

(4.382)

(-5.067)

(-4.855)

(-5.010)

(-5.156)

(-5.671)

.000**

0.000**

.000**

.000**

.000**

0.000**

.000**

.000**

.000**

.000**

(7.875)

7.614

(7.573)

(7.868)

(7.248)

(16.757)

(16.427)

(16.348)

(16.773)

(16.262)

.089

.127

.14

.16

.064

.024

.032

.038

.048

.025

(1.704)

(-1.528)

(-1.479)

(1.407)

(1.854)

(-2.258)

(-2.151)

(-2.076)

(-1.978)

(-2.246)

.154

.154

.153

.153

.172

.392

.397

.395

.393

.394

Note:
The table provides the OLS regression results. For Models (1) to (5), the dependent variable is Div_Ecalculated as
dividend per share divided by earnings per share before extraordinary items. For Models (6) to (10), the dependent
variable is Div_TA calculated as dividend-to-asset ratio. GOV is corporate governance quality which measured
through governance index as shown in Table 1; W_B: is proportion of women on boards; W_EXE: is proportion of
executive women on boards; W_OWN: is Percentage of shares held by women on boards; WM_OWN: is percentage
of shares owned by company’s women major shareholders; FS is firm size measure as the natural logarithm of
firm’s total assets; LVG is financial leverage measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets; ROA is return on
assets calculated by dividing net income plus interest expense on the average total assets. The numbers in the
parentheses are t -value.
** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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6. Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of corporate governance quality and board gender diversity on
corporate dividend policy for a set of all non-financial (i.e. industrial and service) companies
listed on Amman Stock Exchange during the period (2009-2015). The results documented that
corporate governance quality and board gender diversity proxies have positive impact not only
on the propensity to pay dividends but also on the amount of dividend payouts. The outcomes
also revealed that large companies and profitable companies are more likely to pay dividends to
their shareholders, which may possibly refer that these companies tend to convey their good
financial performance. Whereas, firms with high financial leverage are less likely to pay
dividends to their shareholders, which may possibly refer that these companies need funds and
thus tend to retain earnings instead of paying dividends. Moreover, the outcomes of the
correlation matrix indicated that companies with diverse boards are more profitable than
companies with non- diverse boards; the presence of women on boards is considered a factor
contributing to good corporate governance quality; and women are more conservative and risk
averse in their financial decisions relative to men.
The results of descriptive statistics showed that presence of women on the boards of nonfinancial companies in Jordan ranges from 0 to .50 with an average of 0.043, an indication that
the women representation on the boards of non-financial companies in Jordan is considered low
relative to other developing and developed countries, which implies that Jordanian companies
are very far from achieving the quota of 40% women on boards. Particularly, the causes of poor
gender diversity at the boards of Jordanian companies range from lack of awareness about the
benefits of gender diversity on boards to the lack of legislations that regulate this issue where the
existing legislations and the corporate governance code in Jordan have not yet taken any step
towards the issue of gender diversity on boards. Furthermore, the descriptive statistics showed
the corporate governance quality for companies within the sample ranges from 2 to 10, an
indication that some of companies within the sample violate the rules of corporate governance
code. So far, Jordanian companies have not yet reached the phase of full compliance with the
corporate governance code, which may mainly refer to the flexibility given to Jordanian
companies through the “comply or explain” approach instead of the “comply or penalty”
approach.
The results of the study have implicit recommendations for regulatory bodies in Jordan and for
non-financial companies listed on ASE. Particularly, regulatory bodies in Jordan should take a
step towards encouraging gender diversity on boards initially through “comply or explain”
approach. As well, non-financial companies should boost their compliance with corporate
governance code and adopt diversity policies to enhance the effectiveness of the boards and keep
favorable relationships with their shareholders.
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